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l. INTRODUCTION 
The new Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA")1 sets 
forth important statutory directives governing state agency actions. One 
of the UAPA's principal drafters asserts that the judicial review provi-
sions may be the act's "most important contribution to the certainty of 
the law in Utah .... " 2 
The agency adjudication and judicial review provisions of the 
Utah act were developed in large part from the 1981 Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("MSAPA")3 • Some features of the UAPA, 
however, depart from the provisions of the MSAPA.4 This can be ex-
plained by current trends in Utah administrative practice. Yet larger 
national controversies and trends in administrative law influenced de-
velopment of the MSAPA from which the Utah act proceeds generally. 
Those trends have developed in a national context marked by continu-
ing interest in "regulatory reform"11 and amidst criticisms of adminis-
trative "malaise." Thus, the forthcoming Utah experience is ripe with 
potential national significance. Will the act fulfill its promise in bring-
• These comments were presented at the Western States Seminar on State and Local 
Administrative Law, sponsored by the BYU Journal of Public Law, on January 21, 1988. 
•• Attorney General, State of Oregon; State Representative, Oregon Legislative Assembly, 
1975-81; Professor of Law, University of Oregon, 1971-80; A.B. Harvard University, 1962; B.A. 
1964; M.A. Oxford University, 1971; J.D. University of California, Berkeley, 1967. 
1. UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 63-46a-1 to 63-46b-22 (Supp. 1988). 
2. A. SULLIVAN, OVERVIEW OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 5 (Code 
Co. 1987). 
3. MoDEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT (1981), 14 U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter 
MSAPA (1981)]. 
4. 14 U.L.A. 70 (Supp. 1981). The UAPA rulemaking provisions were separately considered 
and enacted. They depart in major respects from the MSAPA. See infra text accompanying notes 
51-52. 
5. See generally Davis, Deregulation and Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 67 
(1988); Frohnmayer, Regulatory Reform: A Slogan in Search of Substance, 66 A.B.A. J. 871 
(1980); Special Project on State Regulatory Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 249. 
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ing clarity and certainty to a body of developed state administrative 
law? Or will it instead become another relic of failed administrative 
law experimentation, destined only for some dusty museum of legal 
antiquities ?6 
The enactment of a new Utah law, the continuing scholarly debate 
over the proper functions and scope of judicial review ,7 and the renewal 
of judicial attention to administrative law in many state jurisdictions8 
all coincide to make state administrative law developments a timely 
topic to revisit. This article examines a number of recent trends in state 
administrative law. While examining these trends the article canvases 
and analyzes some principal judicial review provisions of the MSAPA 
and UAPA. Finally, the article concludes by suggesting briefly the po-
tential for further generations of state administrative law reform which 
build on the Utah experience. 
II. TRENDS IN STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The extensive development of state administrative law in a typical 
American jurisdiction has been chronicled elsewhere.9 Building upon 
these studies, it is now possible to identify a number of emergent trends 
in state administrative practice. These trends underscore the often un-
dervalued importance of state law10 as a critical area for study and 
innovation.11 
6. "[T]o be blunt, the history of American administrative law is a history of failed ideas." J. 
Mashaw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983). 
7. See generally Levin, Scope of Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section 
Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 239 (1986). 
8. See, e.g., A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING (1986); Bonfield, State 
Law In the Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. 
REV. 95 (1982). 
9. See generally Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: An Essay on State 
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 OR. L. REv. 411 (1980). Parochialism or con-
venience aside, Oregon serves as a useful example of a typical American state jurisdiction. The 
state APA, OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310 (1987), both follows and expands upon earlier model acts. 
The bar is informed and guided by sophisticated practitioners and legal scholars. See, e.g., ORE-
GON STATE BAR, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (A. Johnson ed. 1986). The appellate courts are 
well grounded in administrative practice and have contributed opinions of national note. See, e.g., 
Megdal v. Oregon Bd. of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980); Fasano v. Board 
of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon 
Liquor Control Comm'n., 16 Or. App. 63, 517 P.2d 289 (1973). Finally, there is a wealth of 
commentary and analysis in readily accessible form. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL's MoDEL 
RULES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND MANUAL (1985); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CON-
FERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, PAPERS (1985, 1987). 
10. See generally BoNFIELD, supra note 8. 
11. Federal law occasionally exhibits substantial judicial innovation which is often halted by 
the United States Supreme Court. Yet except for minor provisions relating to ex parte contacts, 
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act has remained essentially unchanged since 1946. The 
experience in the states with new innovations has been vastly more active. 
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Legal trends are not always examples of judicial creativity. Court 
decisions may exemplify trends without assuming responsibility for 
their genesis. In public law, courts follow legislatures and administra-
tive agencies as much as they lead them; and the interaction among the 
three branches of government has posed questions which will require 
answers in the equations of new models of judicial analysis. This arti-
cle, as a consequence, will focus not merely on standards by which 
courts review administrative action, but will also examine trends gener-
ated by legislation or by litigation outcomes in state administrative law 
as well. In short, the focus is on what is reviewed as well as how it is 
reviewed. 
A. Trend 1: State jurisdictions Have Enacted And Have 
Increasingly Applied Formal Laws Governing Administrative 
Procedure 
Lawyers often give too much attention to case law and conse-
quently, only passing attention to statutes. This failing accounts for the 
resistance which many statutory reforms of administrative procedure 
have repeatedly faced, even in the recent past. 
Recently, state common law concerning administrative process has 
yielded to statutory enactments and the methodologies of statutory anal-
ysis. Citizens who deal with their governments now must utilize the 
concepts and procedures of state administrative statutes. A significant 
majority of states presently subscribe to some variant of the 1961 Re-
vised Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("RMSAPA") and its 
progeny. 12 More importantly, state appellate courts increasingly apply 
the literal terms of these enactments to govern and change state agency 
behavior/8 as well as to heighten the awareness of that jurisdiction's 
practicing bar. 
Sensitivity to administrative law formalities translates immediately 
into a series of essential, yet elementary admonitions to the legal practi-
tioner. Accusations of administrative law malpractice, accompanied by 
the twin perils of insurance premium increases and blemishes on pro-
fessional reputation, can be easily avoided. Attorneys who challenge the 
12. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE AcT (1961), 14 U.L.A. 157 (Supp. 1988) 
[Hereinafter RMSAPA]. The 1988 Supplement to the UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED lists thirty 
jurisdictions in which portions of the jurisdictions' administrative procedure acts can be traced to 
earlier model acts. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1961), 14 U.L.A. 157 
(Supp. 1988) [hereinafter RMSAPA (1961)]. 
13. State agencies are often the slowest to grasp that procedural statutes are meant to modify 
official behavior, not just to act as a reservoir of remedies for citizens once the agency has ignored 
the law. See, e.g., De St. Germain v. Employment Div., 74 Or. App. 484, 703 P.2d 986 (1985) 
("[A] judicial version of the primal scream" at agency misbehavior). 
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actions of public bodies on behalf of their clients should address the 
following considerations: 
1. Does the government act in question proceed from an af-
firmative grant of constitutional or statutorily delegated authority? 
Simply put, does the state constitution, a state statute, a validly 
promulgated administrative rule, a local government charter or a 
local ordinance even permit the questioned action to occur? 
2. Were all required procedural steps by state or local admin-
istrative procedure acts or ordinances faithfully observed? If not, 
what specific recourse is available to challenge such law 
violations? 
3. Does the state or local law require the governmental entity 
in question to justify its decision, in writing, and with specific 
reasons? 
4. Is the judgment or decision of the governmental entity in 
question subject to review in some other political, quasi-judicial or 
judicial forum? If so, what legal standards and what factual evi-
dence, if any, are relevant to, or govern that review? 
5. Is there an available avenue through which it may be 
cheaper, faster or more appropriate to change the law rather than 
to challenge it? 
These obvious inquiries are the daily grist for the mill of an ad-
ministrative lawyer. The correct answers usually flow from precisely 
considered statutory sources. Yet citizens and legal counsel unaccus-
tomed to the practice of public law at the state and local level have, 
until recently, ignored these avenues at their peril, and to the impover-
ishment of public law. 
B. Trend 2: judicial Enforcement of Procedural Formalities 
Increasingly Exceeds Minimum Compliance, and in Some Cases 
Even Extends Beyond the Literal Provisions of Governing Statutes 
1. Agency rulemaking generally 
a. Federal developments: A backdrop and contrast. Observers of 
federal administrative law developments have remarked upon the em-
bellishment of statutory formalism developed by certain federal cir-
cuits.14 Yet in two noted cases, the United States Supreme Court has 
rebuffed efforts by the federal courts to impose administrative proce-
14. See, e.g., Rodway v. Department of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency rec-
ord required even in informal rulemaking); Wright, New judicial Requisites for Informal 
Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 ADMIN. L. REv. 
59 (1977). 
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dure requirements more onerous for the agency than those of the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
In United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 111 the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that the 
"hearing" requirement of section 1 (14 )(a) of the Interstate Commerce 
Act by itself triggered the formal rulernaking provisions of the federal 
APA. The Court's conclusion was in keeping with considerable schol-
arly criticism of trial-type rulernaking procedure/6 and with the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States, which opposed trial type 
procedures with the thrust of one of its important recornrnendations. 17 
The message of Florida East Coast Railway, however, apparently 
was received with indifference. Consequently, the most telling blow to 
the expanding judicial creativity in devising agency procedure was not 
authoritatively struck until 1978. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. NRDC, 18 the Supreme Court "authoritatively convicted" the 
"imperial judiciary [of] riding roughshod over the agencies .... "19 The 
Supreme Court seems to have read the federal APA to preclude judicial 
insistence on "hybrid" hearing requirements beyond those expressly 
and literally imposed by statute. At least some lower federal court 
judges have not accepted the verdict happily. For example, former Con-
gressman, now Circuit Judge Abner Mikva, recently levelled a broad-
side blow of his own at the Vermont Yankee opinion, stating: "I cannot 
think of any other decision that has done more to bollix up administra-
tive law in the past decade. The Court tried to clean up a whole area of 
regulatory doctrine, and it succeeded only in making the mess worse."20 
Of course, the United States Supreme Court cannot alone stern the 
tide of growing formalization of the federal agency rulernaking process. 
This is especially true since Congress itself often has prescribed addi-
tional standards for the rulernaking process going beyond the minimum 
"notice and comment" requirements of section 553 of the Federal APA. 
When Congress has spoken, no court is free to bless agency evasion of 
additional standards,21 even when those standards contribute to the loss 
of procedural uniformity in federal agency practice.22 
15. 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
16. See, e.g., Hamilton, Procedures for Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The 
Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276 (1972). 
17. Recommendation No. 72-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1975). 
18. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
19. Starr, judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 353, 369 (1987). 
20. Mikva, The Changing Role of judicial Review, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 115, 122 (1986). 
21. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(19) 
(statutorily provided right of cross-examination on disputed factual issues). 
22. Variances between the Federal APA's minimum "notice and comment" requirements and 
6 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
b. State law developments. State jurisprudence on agency 
rulemaking largely has by-passed both the heated rhetoric of federal 
courts and the analytical battles of scholars fought at the federal level 
over the "hard look" doctrine23 (a detailed factual review of the agency 
action) and its variants. Yet there are signs that many of the conflicting 
currents of federal administrative law also find analogues in state ad-
ministrative law developments. 
Many of the theoretical values of the administrative pro-
cess-speed, efficiency, superior expertise and flexibility-can be lost if 
the quasi-legislative process is fossilized by excessive overlays of re-
quired procedure. Yet those same values remain unfulfilled if, in the 
pursuit of efficiency and expertise, the agency is allowed lawlessly to 
ignore its legislatively imposed mandate. Some commentators obviously 
believe that detailed factual review of the agency action by courts is the 
only disciplinary mechanism that effectively will insure agency fidelity 
to law.24 
These tensions in the premises of modern administrative law are 
not easily resolved; in fact they reflect conflicts in fundamental values. 
As a matter of separation of powers principles, legislatures, courts and 
agencies often dispute their respective claims to government turf. But 
this debate is not simply an otherwise value-neutral discourse about 
how best to implement constitutional commands by allocating duties to 
government institutions. Citizens and interest groups have high stakes 
in ultimate political outcomes, not just in the choice of process for its 
own sake. Court decisions reflect ideological commitments as well as 
views of the appropriate formality of administrative and judicial 
processes. Finally, scholars and courts stake out positions on these legal 
issues based on often unarticulated values concerning the appropriate 
functions of administrative procedures generally. 211 
specific statutory requirements are so significant that one court complained overtly that Congress 
made "a conscious effort never to use the same phraseology twice." Associated Indus. of New York 
v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 345 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973). 
23. The phrase is that of Judge Leventhal. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking 
and the Role of the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974). For further analysis, see Sunstein, In 
Defense of the Hard Look: judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 7 HARV. ]. L. & Pus. 
Pm.'v 51 (1984); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 177. 
24. See, e.g., Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L. ]. 38, 59-
60 (1975). 
25. See generally Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 393 (1981); Frohnmayer, supra note 9, at 459-62. 
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2. State agency rulemaking 
a. Compliance with minimum procedural requirements. State 
court decisions now insist almost uniformly that agencies comply with 
literal statutory requirements respecting the promulgation, amendment 
or repeal of agency rules. Agencies cannot evade observance of these 
formalities, for example, by ignoring the definition sections of the ad-
ministrative procedure acts. If an agency policy declaration fits the defi-
nition of "rule," the action is judged by its functional effect, not by the 
agency's label.28 No semantic manipulation describing the act as a 
"guideline,"27 a "handbook,"28 or an "internal management direc-
tive,"29 properly suffices to evade rulemaking procedural requirements. 
Similarly, repeal of a rule usually constitutes rulemaking under state 
acts, and likewise, literal compliance with formalities is enforced.30 
Agencies also may be tempted to evade rulemaking formalities, whether 
due to impatience with bureaucratic delay or a more contemptible de-
sire to evade occasions for available public comment by using emer-
gency or temporary rulemaking procedures. However, both legislative 
changes31 and court decisions32 have rendered this avenue a less likely 
escape from required legal procedures. 
b. Formal rulemaking in the states. The thrust of the MSAPA is 
to avoid excessive procedural formality. Yet its provisions may require 
delay, expense and interruption beyond the contemplation of its au-
thors. Utah has chosen consciously to avoid several potential pitfalls of 
the 1981 MSAP A as well as those exemplified by federal developments. 
This section explores, briefly, the alternatives which are presented. 
For the most part, state administrative procedure acts have not 
mimicked the formal rulemaking requirements of their federal APA 
counterpart.33 Consequently, the trial-type model of rulemaking and 
related issues concerning "hybrid" procedures have not been markedly 
26. Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). See generally Lane v. 
Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 727 P.2d 206 (Utah 1986); see, e.g., Chesire Convales-
cent Center, Inc. v. Commission on Hosp. and Health Care, 34 Conn. Supp. 255, 386 A.2d 264 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1977). The Utah Supreme Court has followed these trends. 
27. See, e.g., Lehman v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of New York, 82 A.D.2d 832, 
439 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
28. See, e.g., Clark v. Public Welfare Div., 27 Or. App. 473, 556 P.2d 722 (1976); Will v. 
Department of Health and Social Serv., 44 Wis. 2d 507, 171 N.W.2d 378 (1969). 
29. See, e.g., Grey Panthers v. Public Welfare Div., 28 Or. App. 841, 561 P.2d 674 (1977); 
Schinzel v. Department of Corrections, 124 Mich. App. 217, 333 N.W.2d 519 (1983). 
30. See, e.g., Rivas v. Board of Cosmetologists, 101 N.M. 592, 686 P.2d 934 (1984). 
31. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 183.335(5)(a) (1971) (specific findings required). 
32. American Grain Prods. Processing lnst. v. Department of Pub. Health, 392 Mass. 309, 
467 N.E.2d 455 (1984). 
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556, 557 (1982). 
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evident in state administrative jurisprudence. Unlike the federal APA, 
state acts often include interpretive rules3• within the ambit of 
rulemaking requirements. Broad federal exemptions, such as those for 
policies concerning public property, grants, loans and contracts35 often 
are not carried into state laws.36 The river of procedural requirements 
flows more broadly in the states, but it does not cut so deeply. 
These observations briefly canvass the differences in the range of 
agency actions subject to APA coverage. Other state developments sug-
gest that the formality evident at the federal level has some state ana-
logues. The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, for example, im-
poses significant trial-type requirements on agency rulemaking.37 The 
burdens are so onerous that a leading scholar has condemned them as 
unwieldy and counterproductive. 36 The Minnesota experience should 
not be replicated by other states. 
3. The agency "statement of need" 
Requirements short of a trial-type hearing might, over time, lead 
to the evolution of "hybrid" procedures in state jurisdictions. In Ore-
gon, for example, the state APA requires the initial notice of rulemak-
ing to be accompanied by a public articulation of the agency's specific 
legal authority, and by a "statement of need" for the rule, as well as a 
justification as to how the proposed rule meets the articulated need. 39 
This public notice device, however, simply requires a description of the 
agency's means-ends reasoning. This statutory obligation is far less on-
erous than the process of limiting the content of rules to considerations 
formally introduced into an exclusive rulemaking hearing "record." 
The reasons are obvious. An expanded notice requirement is simply a 
matter of public information. It does not engage the expansive and 
time-consuming procedural machinery of formal hearings. 
The Oregon approach may recommend itself to other jurisdictions. 
It does not provide for (and, in fact explicitly disclaims) any evidentiary 
record in rulemaking!0 The required provision of the agency's ration-
34. Cf Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Inter-
pretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the APA, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 101 
(1971). 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1982). 
36. But see, Caldwell v. Amoco Fabrics Co., 165 Ga. App. 674, 302 S.E.2d 596 (1983) 
(Georgia statute exempts policies relating to state or agency benefits). 
37. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.04-.41 (1977). 
38. See generally Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63 MINN. L. REv. 
151 (1979). 
39. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 183.335(2)(b)(B-C) (1971). 
40. /d. at § 183.335(12). 
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ale for a proposed rule comes at the very initiation of the process. This 
procedural device maximizes the possibility for public notice, legislative 
review and political reaction to the proposal before the agency ever 
takes final rulemaking action.'u 
4. Required "reasons" in agency rulemaking: an analysis and 
critique 
State courts have significantly reinforced the language of the Re-
vised Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961. The 1961 Act 
requires an agency to issue a "concise statement of the principal rea-
sons for and against [a rule's] adoption, incorporating therein its rea-
sons for overruling the considerations urged against its adoption."'2 
Even absent a statute directing the articulation of reasons, in Tri-State 
Generation and Transmission Association v. Environmental Quality 
Council, 43 the Wyoming Supreme Court enforced a requirement that 
an agency must develop a statement justifying the agency's rulemaking 
decision, and held the agency to the contents of that statement to insure 
that judicial review of the process could be pursued meaningfully. 
The Uniform Law Commissioner's Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1981 modifies commonly understood agency rulemak-
ing requirements.•• In at least one respect, however, the MSAPA im-
poses ill-advised conditions. Section 3-110(b) of the Act specifically im-
poses a "reasons" requirement by providing that "[o]nly the reasons 
contained in the concise explanatory statement may be used by any 
party as justifications for the adoption of the rule in any proceeding in 
which its validity is at issue."411 The official comment to this section 
justifies this restriction by castigating the evils of post-hoc agency ratio-
nalizations for action.48 It argues that later-ascribed reasons would be 
unfairly withheld from scrutiny in the open rulemaking process itself. 
Finally, the comment contends that administrative agencies should not 
be protected from failure to consider, prior to the time of decisionmak-
ing, all relevant defensible reasons for a choice. 47 
41. See generally Frohnmayer, supra note 9, 455-67. 
42. RMSAPA (1961) § 3(a)(2), 14 U.L.A. 387 (1987). 
43. 590 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1979). 
44. See MSAPA ( 1981) § 3-110, comment, 14 U .L.A. 97-98 (Supp. 1988). The revision 
sensibly no longer requires the agency to engage in line-by-line rebuttal of policy positions not 
adopted by it. In a proceeding attracting any volume of responses, prolonging debate over the 
many roads not taken could readily generate wasteful diversions of time, tax dollars and scarce 
expertise. 
45. MSAPA (1981) § 3-110(b), 14 U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1988). 
46. See supra note 44, at 97-98. 
47. /d. 
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Notwithstanding the carefully considered reasoning of the Com-
missioners on Uniform Laws, adoption of subsection 3-llO(b) could 
work substantial mischief. The benefits suggested by the Commission-
ers do not outweigh the likely adverse realities of implementation on 
practice. 48 
First, it is not easy to see precisely how any articulated agency 
"reasons" can bear on the fundamental legal validity of a quasi-legisla-
tive rule. The grounds for invalidating agency action under the 
MSAPA are specified in section 5-116,49 which deals with scope of 
judicial review. In the ordinary case, a rule should survive attack if the 
agency's action complies with rulemaking procedure, is within the 
agency's statutorily delegated discretion, and is otherwise constitutional. 
It is difficult to envision how the agency's articulated reasons for a dis-
cretionary policy choice routinely would bear on these exclusively legal 
questions. The legality of a rule ought to be determined by an objective 
standard, based upon a textual analysis of the rule's scope and 
substance. 
The plea for an objective standard is grounded in an important 
reality. Uninvolved third parties and citizens-at-large routinely may 
have important reliance interests in the validity of agency action. Reli-
ance interests often have accompanying monetary costs, and ought not 
to be upset by uncertainty regarding whether the agency has described 
fully all reasons for its otherwise validly chosen policy. 
If the "reasons" requirement suggests that more substance of the 
agency's policy choice can be reviewed, it appears to impose, sub silen-
tio, an implied requirement that the agency must produce some factual 
or policy predicates to justify its choice. Unfortunately, the dimensions 
of those shadowy requirements are hopelessly unclear. They do not fit 
easily into the quasi-legislative model of agency policy choice (it is axi-
omatic that legislators are never required to articulate the reasons for 
policy choices they enact into statutes). Further, those implied "rea-
sons" requirements advance a disquietingly activist, rather than defer-
ential, posture for the reviewing court-or at least they leave this temp-
tation open to creative advocacy. Repeated litigation would undoubtedly 
be required to clarify the inevitably murky lines that separate "rea-
sons" from the "facts," "arguments," or "assertions" which support 
them. 
48. This argument goes against the grain of much administrative law theory, and, indeed, 
against criticism that the MSAPA itself does not go far enough. Rago, Rulemaking Under the 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act: An Opportunity Missed, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. 445 
(1982). The critics themselves are taken to task in Rosenblum, Book Review, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 
525 (1987) (reviewing A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING (1986)). 
49. MSAPA (1981) § 5-116, 14 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1988). 
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Second, the full force of the "comprehensive rationality" model of 
decisionmaking is implicit in the "reasons" requirement. The rational-
technical model here ignores the usual environment of state administra-
tive decisionmaking. The typical state agency is not rich in staff depth. 
The two commodities in shortest supply in the typical state agency are 
likely to be political courage and executive time. The stock of each can 
be rapidly depleted by the burdens of this requirement. Therefore, to 
expect articulation in advance of all reasons justifying an action im-
poses a burden of time and delay not easily justified by the likely bene-
fit of more complete articulation of every possible rationale of the 
agency's policy. 
Furthermore, the exercise of expert judgment-and that is often 
the essence of a discretionary rulemaking policy choice-is often a mix-
ture of experience, values and refined intuition. Considerations leading 
to the act of policy judgment may not be as easily reducible to a set of 
"reasons" as the 1981 MSAPA model assumes. 50 These problems are 
compounded in circumstances typically encountered in state govern-
ment. The agency decision genuinely may be collegial. Thousands of 
multi-member citizen boards and commissions in the fifty states rou-
tinely exercise rulemaking responsibilities. They may do so after hear-
ing or reviewing hundreds of considerations from the affected public 
favoring or opposing a course of action. To expect the members of a 
body to reduce their reasoning, or to psychoanalyze that of their col-
leagues, into a conclusively binding set of reasons, ignores group psy-
chology, risks extension of the decisionmaking process indefinitely, and 
maximizes the possibility that decisions will be based on the lowest 
common policy denominator. 
Third, the "reasons" requirement devalues the quasi-legislative 
character of rulemaking generally. Unlike criminal law where courts 
require police to specify their exact reasons for a search, the prevailing 
rule is clearly otherwise for the outcomes of legislative action. In deter-
mining whether the legislature has acted within the scope of its plenary 
authority, courts do not look to the considerations legislators overtly 
advance; they accept those of which a rational person might plausibly 
conceive.51 No convincing reasons are given why the Model Act should 
depart so markedly from this fundamental characteristic of the legisla-
tive model. 52 
50. See generally Levin, supra note 7 at 281-82. 
51. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 582 (1988). 
52. Professor Bonfield has suggested to the author that the legislative analogy should not 
apply because the administrative process is not politically accountable to the same degree as the 
legislature. Three short responses should suffice: first, the agency rulemaking process itself only 
12 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
Finally, consider the likely institutional consequences of the "rea-
sons" requirement imposed by MSAPA section 3-110(b). It almost as-
suredly provides full employment opportunity for government lawyers. 
Apart from the expense and delay occasioned by the staff preparation 
and legal analysis, it is not clear that the quality of agency decision-
making would be improved. It may simply be that predecision rational-
izations compiled by agency lawyers, rather than post hoc rationaliza-
tions advanced by appellate counsel, will mask the processes of decision. 
This requirement, after all, simply infuses a new game of political an-
ticipation. Agencies and their counsel will be tempted to advance the 
most all-encompassing (and hence potentially uninformative) "rea-
sons." They likely will state these reasons at the broadest level of gen-
erality lest they later be accused of overlooking specific considerations 
which those vague but global reasons might subsume. The agency thus 
has powerful incentives to give less information, albeit in general terms, 
in order to better protect its own later options. State legislatures should 
react with caution before adopting a provision which encourages such 
behavior. 
5. Rulemaking in Utah: agency discretion preserved 
The foregoing discussion will only be of academic interest in Utah 
given the present direction of legislative policy respecting agency 
rulemaking. Utah law imposes no requirement that rulemaking policy 
choices must be justified by a statement of reasons in any form. The 
Utah act even goes so far as to omit the language, almost universally 
adopted from the 1961 model act, which requires an agency to "con-
sider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed 
rule." 118 This omission was deliberate114 and was designed to help pre-
clude judicial review of agency policy choice in the rulemaking process. 
exists by virtue of direct delegation of authority to the agency from the politically accountable 
legislatures. Second, the MSAPA abounds with procedural devices that reinforce political control 
over the administrative process. Finally, the rulemaking result itself is subject to immediate legisla-
tive reversal, unlike the outcomes of agency adjudication which might claim immunity from 
change by virtue of due process considerations. 
53. RMSAPA (1961) § 3(a)(2), 14 U.L.A. 387 (1980). It is an open question whether or 
how compliance with this provision might be judicially enforced. The author has found no re-
ported case of any jurisdiction in which this requirement has been cited or discussed. Presumably 
an agency's failure in good faith to consider public comments could be attacked under this directive 
in a jurisdiction which retained the "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standard 
for judicial review of rulemaking. Yet there still remains the threshold question how the factual 
basis for the challenge might even be discovered or explored. See generally Frohnmayer, supra 
note 9, at 468. 
54. Personal conversation with William S. Callaghan, Ph.D., Director, Utah State Division 
of Administrative Rules (Jan. 22, 1988). 
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A more definitive form of deference to agency judgment is hard to 
envision. 
6. "Reasons" in rulemaking: a middle course 
The RMSAPA and the Utah Act each occupy a polar extreme 
respecting the desirability of articulated agency reasons in the rulemak-
ing process. Both formulations probably stem from differing underlying 
models of the administrative process. The Model Act embodies an overt 
"comprehensive rationality" approach, and the Utah Act is an almost 
classical exemplar of deference to agency expertise. A middle course is 
available which avoids the more obvious pitfalls of each extreme. 
The middle course requires agency reasoning to be articulated at 
the outset of the rulemaking process so that informed comments and 
responses may be developed by the public; yet it avoids excessive entan-
glement in a substantive judicial process of rule review. The controls on 
agency discretion are thorough requirements of procedural openness 
and political oversight: modes of control best lending themselves to the 
underlying quasi-legislative character of agency rulemaking.1111 
7. Agency regulatory analysis: pitfalls to avoid 
One final topic in the area of developing state rulemaking proce-
dures deserves cautionary mention. Several jurisdictions have experi-
mented with requiring agencies to develop "small business impact" 
statements or other cost benefit studies as a precondition to agency 
rulemaking. 116 In an optional provision, the Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws for the 1981 Model Act propose section 3-105117 relating to 
required agency "regulatory analysis." The comment by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws overtly notes that the preparation of 
such analysis is "burdensome," "hazardous" and potentially "subject to 
great abuse. " 118 
The cautionary language of the Commissioners is well taken. For 
the bureaucratic complexities of analysis, language and technical exper-
tise which such requirements quickly can produce, the reader need only 
refer to federal agency paralysis engendered by this subject.119 The jum-
55. These thoughts and the models of agency procedure to which they relate are more fully 
developed in Frohnmayer, supra note 9, at 455-68. 
56. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws§ 42-35 (1956); IDAHO Com§§ 67-5201 to 67-5218 (1980); 
FLA. LAWS, § 120.54(2)(a) (1982). 
57. 14 U.L.A. 92 (Supp. 1988). 
58. Jd. 
59. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1243 (1987). 
See generally A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 212-25 (1986); Schwartz, 
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ble of considerations confronting courts which seek to review agency 
cost-benefit analyses should deter even the most adventurous. 
C. Trend 3: Courts Increasingly Impose Minimal Rulemaking 
Requirements Beyond the Specification of Statutes 
At the federal level, settled law has permitted administrative agen-
cies to choose, within their discretion, whether to develop agency policy 
by rulemaking or through case-by-case adjudication.60 Despite critical 
commentary in scholarly journals,61 no obvious indication of a pending 
change in direction is apparent. 
Developments in some state jurisdictions reflect a trend contrary to 
the federal approach. In Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon Li-
quor Control Commission, 62 the Oregon Court of Appeals required a 
liquor licensing agency to articulate rules in advance of licensing ac-
tions taken by the agency under a broad statutory mandate. The court 
reasoned that only under an articulated-rule approach could meaning-
ful standards be devised to govern the decision of contested cases under 
the Oregon AP A. 
The Sun Ray decision has not been adopted expressly by the Ore-
gon Supreme Court, perhaps in part because the Oregon Administra-
tive Procedure Act cannot be read clearly to require pre-enforcement 
rulemaking.63 However, the Oregon Supreme Court, and appellate 
courts of other jurisdictions64 have reached similar conclusions. 
In a trilogy of important cases-Trebesch v. Employment Divi-
sion, Springfield Education Association v. Springfield School District 
No. 19, and Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners,6~> 
the Oregon Supreme Court has attempted to define the criteria gov-
The Court and Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Administrative Law Idea Whose Time Has Come -
Or Gone?, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 291. 
60. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 
U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974). 
61. See, e.g., Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of 
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965). 
62. 16 Or. App. 63, 517 P.2d 289 (1973). The opinion of Judge Tanzer still is one of the 
single best appellate court sources articulating the values of agency rulemaking. 
63. OR. REV. STAT.§ 183.355(5) (1971), expressly provides for the validity of general rules 
arising from the disposition of contested cases. 
64. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 478 A.2d 742 
(1984); Anderson v. State, 135 Ariz. 578, 663 P.2d 570 (App. 1982). See generally Bonfield, 
Mandating State Agency Lawmaking by Rule, 2 B.Y.U J. PuB. L. 161 (1988). 
65. Trebesch v. Employment Div., 300 Or. 264, 710 P.2d 136 (1986); Springfield Educ. 
Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 290 Or. 217, 621 P.2d 547 (1980); Megdal v. Oregon 
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980). This trilogy is discussed 
briefly in Frohnmayer, Of Legislative Intent, the Perils of Legislative Abdication, and the 
Growth of Administrative and judicial Power, 22 WILLAMETTE L. J. 219, 234-35 (1986). 
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erning an agency's obligation to develop rules in advance of enforce-
ment action (a "pre-enforcement rulemaking obligation"). The pre-en-
forcement rulemaking obligation in these decisions is treated as an 
adjunct, not of a requirement internal to the state APA, but as an as-
pect of the law of delegated authority and of statutory construction. In 
Megdal, the court held that the agency had an obligation to engage in 
pre-enforcement rulemaking with respect to the term "unprofessional 
conduct." The term was deemed by the court to be a shorthand delega-
tion of power and as such required agency rules to refine specific stan-
dards before enforcement action could occur.66 In Springfield, the 
Court articulated refinements of this analysis which attempted to parse 
types of statutory language into three categories. The characterization 
of the language of statutory delegation was then said to dictate the ex-
tent of the agency's rulemaking obligation. 
However, while paying homage to the Megdal I Springfield analy-
sis, the court six years later in Trebesch cast doubt on whether the 
agency's clarification of governing law must invariably be accomplished 
by advance rulemaking.67 The purported reasoning of Trebesch lies in 
detailed analysis of the text and legislative history of each statutory 
scheme at issue.68 Whether statutes always give birth to clear answers 
after such analysis is, of course, open to serious question. 
The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides 
more specific guidance than the still-evolving state case law. Sections 2-
104(3) and 2-104(4) require an agency "as soon as feasible, and to the 
extent practicable," to adopt rules articulating standards governing the 
law it administers, and to adopt rules superseding principles declared 
in particular adjudications. While the language of the 1981 act is sus-
ceptible to dispute concerning the meaning of what is "feasible" or 
"practicable," the provisions are a potentially flexible and helpful uni-
form statutory clarification of evolving law at the state level. 
D. Trend 4: Constitutional and Statutory Developments Have 
Expanded Dramatically Both the Nature and Substance of 
Controversies Requiring the Use of Formal Adjudication Procedures 
In federal administrative law, the number of agency actions subject 
to formal adjudication procedure under the APA is severely limited. 
66. For an excellent and thorough discussion of Megdal see generally Bonfield, supra note 
64, at 184-92. 
67. See Trebesch v. Employment Div., 300 Or. 264, 267-70, 710 P.2d 136, 137-40 (1986). 
68. See also Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 300 Or. 507, 716 P.2d 724 (1986) 
(construction of term "immorality" can be achieved either through prior rulemaking or reasoned 
orders in contested cases). 
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Not only is formal adjudication procedure in the federal act subject to a 
number of exceptions,69 the adjudication provisions themselves are trig-
gered only if a separate statute requires an agency hearing "on the 
record. "70 
1. Broad state statutory entitlements to an agency hearing 
The case is to the contrary on the state level. Formal trial-type 
procedures required in "on the record" hearings are likely to be far 
more numerous in the states for several reasons. First, the conditions 
giving rise to formal hearings usually are specified in self-contained 
procedural statutes which are broader in scope than the federal AP A. 
The 1961 Model Act, for example, defines a "contested case" more 
expansively than its federal counterpart defines an adjudication. 71 
Second, no statutory mandate limits formal adjudications to those 
where a statute provides for a hearing "on the record." State AP A pro-
visions typically require an agency hearing when the hearing require-
ment stems from state statute or from a constitutional provision.72 
Third, some states require agency hearings in conditions extending well 
beyond those of the Revised 1961 Model Act. 
The Oregon APA, for example, creates a "contested case" in in-
stances where the agency has "discretion to suspend or revoke the right 
or privilege of a person."73 This obviously expansionary language has 
given rise to surprisingly few legal claims as to what might be charac-
terized inventively as a "right" or "privilege."74 In Morrison v. Oregon 
Health Sciences University/ 5 the dismissal of a student from the school 
of dentistry on the grounds of poor clinical performance was held to 
give rise to a "contested case" under this provision. The result is of 
interest because it goes well beyond any explicit command of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 
A more subtle point relating to APA adjudicatory hearing require-
69. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1)-(6) (1982). 
70. Id. § 554(a). 
71. RMSAPA (1961) § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 371 (1980). 
72. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Douglass, 452 A.2d 329 (D.C. App. 1982); Dremel v. 
State Nursing Home Review Bd., 119 Wis. 2d 75, 349 N.W.2d 725 (1984). 
73. OR. REv. STAT. § 183.310(2)(a)(B) (1971). 
74. The entitlement in question, for example, must be broader than one of constitutional 
dimension, since no government has discretion to "suspend or revoke" a constitutional guarantee. 
75. 68 Or. App. 870, 685 P.2d 439 (1984). See also Patton v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 293 
Or. 363, 647 P.2d 931 (1982). 
76. See, e.g., Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). However, 
the Oregon Court of Appeals declined to require a contested case hearing where a faculty member 
was reassigned but with no loss of salary, rank or privilege. Walker v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher 
Educ., 66 Or. App. 448, 674 P.2d 88 (1984). 
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ments deserves attention. In the confrontation between citizens and 
their governments, the very existence of APA procedures alters the bal-
ance of power and shifts the agency's assertive posture to a more defen-
sive one. If a hearing is due to a person entitled to a contested case, the 
agency has the obligation to initiate the process. The agency must 
frame the issues and give appropriate notice. The burden of assessing 
the justification for agency action thus shifts from those adversely im-
pacted by it to those in the agency who propose to undertake it initially. 
2. The "due process revolution" 
The "due process revolution"77 is far more responsible for the in-
crease in scope and volume of state agency contested cases than is any 
other specific statutory or judicial development. At the federal govern-
ment and many local government levels, the procedural requirements 
imposed by the due process clause to protect a particular "interest" are 
variable according to the nature and weight of the controversy.78 How-
ever, this appears not to be the case in many states. If the United States 
Constitution requires a hearing at all, the normal procedures governing 
conduct of contested cases in the state APA automatically apply in their 
entirety.79 The uncertainties of a flexible due process calculus are 
avoided at the cost of requiring a high, and perhaps unduly expensive, 
degree of statutorily required procedural formality. 
77. The "revolution" was, for these purposes, largely established by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254 (1970). See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 
(1975); j. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). 
78. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) with Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976) and Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See generally 
Friendly, supra note 77. 
79. This result follows from a literal reading of the definition of "contested case" in § 1 (2) of 
the RMSAPA; the definition is triggered when "the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party 
are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." RMSAPA 
(1961) § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 371 (1980) (emphasis added). The due process clause is "law," and the 
drafters of the RMSAPA omitted the reference to hearings required by "constitutional right" 
because the phrase simply was unnecessary. 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 120 
(1965). 
The experience of several states may not, however, be as clear-cut as the definition seems to 
command. There is continuing ambivalence in some jurisdictions as to whether state laws based on 
the 1961 Model Act in fact embody the guarantee of an APA adjudicative hearing where constitu-
tional due process is implicated. Letter to the author from Professor Harold Levinson (January 
26, 1988). See generally Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 477 A.2d 119 
(1984); Donnelly Ass'n v. District of Columbia Review Bd., 520 A.2d 270 (D.C. App. 1987); Bay 
Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So.2d 302 (Fla. App. 1969). See generally Bonfield, 
The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 
IowA L. REv. 285 (1977). The 1974 Florida Administrative Procedure Act specifically rejected 
the conclusion of Bay National Bank that "quasi-executive" actions such as licensing were not 
"contested cases." Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 
1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617, 628 (1975) 
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The United States Supreme Court arguably broadened the reach 
of due process protections believing the burdens might be tempered by 
flexibility in prescribing procedures.80 The tradeoff of flexibility is lost, 
however, if contested case procedures always must be observed in their 
entirety. 81 The concern is not a trivial one, because trivial fact situa-
tions may still require expensive complex proceedings.82 This aU-or-
nothing approach to due process analysis clearly is the unintended con-
sequence of tying a single adjudicatory procedure to any legally im-
posed hearing requirement. 
The new MSAPA83 and the UAPA84 provide welcome, if as yet 
untested, innovations to help resolve the quandary of adjudicatory over-
formalization. The Model Act provides a structured "formal adjudica-
tive proceeding" (§ 4-201), a "conference adjudicative proceeding" (§ 
4-401 ), an "emergency adjudicative proceeding" ( § 4-501) and the 
"summary adjudicative proceeding" (§ 4-502).85 The latter three proce-
dures are innovations which do much to adapt statutory decisionmaking 
models to the realities of a broad variety of occasions where less rigor-
ous agency procedures nonetheless fully protect citizens' rights as they 
confront their governments. 
The Utah act does not adopt all aspects of the less formal adjudi-
cative procedures of the 1981 Model Act. 86 Nonetheless, it provides a 
welcome and less rigid alteniative to be copied by jurisdictions which 
now utilize the single-tier approach to agency adjudication. 
E. Trend 5: The Power of a State Agency to Adjudicate 
Constitutional Issues in Agency Litigation: Developments 
Demonstrate Continuing Controversy 
While growing recognition of an administrative agency's responsi-
bility to rule on constitutional issues does not yet deserve the label of a 
80. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
81. Only a few states have provided in the past for less than a formally structured adjudica-
tory proceeding. Maine permits limitation of issues or alteration of procedural requirements upon 
agreement of the parties and the agency. Delaware, Florida, Montana and Virginia "describe at 
least the rudiments of less-than-formal adjudication." MSAPA (1981) § 4-102, comment, 14 
U.L.A.114-15 (Supp.1988). 
82. See, e.g., O'Neil, Recalculating the Cost-Benefit Balance for Trial-Type Procedures, 38 
ADMIN. L. REv. 141 (1986) (replaced faculty string quintet member invokes due process right to 
contested case hearing). 
83. MSAPA (1981) Art. IV, 14 U.L.A. 112 (Supp. 1988). 
84. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-46b-3 (Supp. 1988). 
85. See generally Levinson, An Introduction to the 1981 Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act, Part II: Adjudication, Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 13, 
14-21 (1982). 
86. See supra note 84. 
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developed trend, this important issue recently has received further judi-
cial articulation. In Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4-J, 87 the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that a review agency not only was em-
powered, but had the affirmative duty to decide constitutional issues 
arising from the revocation of a teacher's certificate for wearing reli-
gious garb in the classroom in violation of a state statute. 
Utah88 and a number of other jurisdictions89 deny an administra-
tive agency the authority to rule upon constitutional questions. Utah 
appellate courts may wish to revisit this issue in light of the new Utah 
APA. The order of the presiding officer, under the new UAPA's judi-
cial review provisions, almost axiomatically, is required to state "con-
clusions of law"90 in a formal adjudicative proceeding. It is difficult at 
first blush to see how considerations of constitutional law could be 
omitted. Moreover, a reviewing court must grant relief if the agency 
"has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution,"91 or has "erro-
neously interpreted or applied the law."92 Most importantly, the re-
viewing court must grant relief when "the agency action, or the statute 
or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied."93 Each of these directives to the reviewing court 
might easily be read to imply that the agency has an implicit duty in 
the first instance to prevent the identified forms of agency error even 
from reaching the court. In light of the imperatives of this language, 
the reviewing court or the agency cannot acquiesce in the agency's fail-
ure to resolve a constitutional issue presented in the controversy at the 
agency level. 
F. Trend 6: judicial Insistence on Strict Compliance with the 
Statutory Requirement of "Findings" in Agency Adjudicatory 
Orders is Strict Construction and Much More 
One of the most noticeable developments reflected in recent state 
administrative jurisprudence is appellate court enforcement of statutory 
requirements governing the content of agency orders. The almost uni-
versal requirement that adjudicatory orders must be accompanied by 
"findings of fact" has received particular attention. Not only must the 
87. 301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298 (1986), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1597 (1987). 
88. Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941). 
89. See generally Comment, When Constitutional Issues Arise in Agency Adjudications: A 
Suggested Approach, 65 OR. L. REv. 413 (1986). 
90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-10(1)(b) (Supp. 1988). 
91. /d. at § 63-46b-16(4)(c). 
92. Id. at § 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
93. /d. at§ 63-46b-16(4)(a). 
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agency go beyond the mere parroting of statutory language,94 but courts 
also increasingly insist that the agency decision be accompanied by a 
"reasoned explanation" of its findings and decisions.95 The requirement 
is obviously intended to assure a reasoned decision by the agency and to 
facilitate meaningful judicial review thereafter. 96 A mere summary of 
the evidence, even if comprehensive, will not suffice to meet the statu-
tory requirement. 97 Beyond the literal "findings" requirements, some 
courts now require articulation in some depth of the reasoning 
processes through which the agency decisionmaker relates findings to 
the conclusions. 98 
Ordinarily, it would come as no surprise that reviewing courts in-
sist on agency compliance with a clearly articulated statutory require-
ment. Two considerations, however, make mention of this requirement 
necessary. First, given the volume of state administrative agency adjudi-
cations which occur each year, it would be astonishing if more than a 
small handful of state agencies even now comply fully in every particu-
lar with the findings requirement prescribed by most statutes-at least 
if explicit findings are required in the case of every remotely contested 
issue of fact. Second, the degree to which reviewing courts overtly have 
added additional considerations merits attention. Recent Oregon devel-
opments are instructive and may signify a further, more cautious judi-
cial mid-course correction of tendencies to require exhaustive articula-
tion of factual findings. 
In Cascade Forest Products v. Accident Prevention Division, 99 
the Oregon Court of Appeals held an agency contested case order insuf-
ficient because it did not list a concise statement of underlying facts 
supporting the agency's findings as to each "contested issue of fact" and 
as to each "ultimate fact." In addition, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
94. Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Presbyterian Hosp., 690 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985). 
95. See Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1979, 32 ADMIN. L. REv. 411, 430 
(1980); Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1984, 37 ADMIN. L. REv. 133, 145-46 
(1985). See also Voight v. Washington Island Ferry Line, Inc., 79 Wis. 2d 333, 255 N.W.2d 545 
(1977). 
96. Few decisions fully articulate why the reviewing court adopts either a stringent or a more 
deferential posture respecting the findings requirement. Some such requirement seems essential to 
make the already lenient "substantial evidence" standard even remotely meaningful at the agency 
level. Without articulated findings of some specificity, it might not be discoverable whether the 
agency has established the factual premises justifying its action. 
97. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 253 S.E.2d 912 (1979); Novell v. Portland Area 
LGBC, 43 Or. App. 849, 604 P.2d 896 (1979). 
98. See, e.g., Home Plate, Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 20 Or. App. 188, 530 
P.2d 862 (1975) ("substantial reasons" requirement). The source of an obligation to explain con-
clusions at length is not readily apparent from the text of the typical APA. It may be questioned 
whether this judicial gloss on statutory law is either justified or appropriate. 
99. 60 Or. App. 255, 260, 653 P.2d 574, 577 (1982). 
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recently has held that, where credibility determinations are important 
to the decision of a case, the presiding officer or referee must make an 
explicit finding as to the credibility of a claimant. 100 However, in Den-
nis v. Employment Division101 and Hyde v. Employment Division/02 
the Oregon Supreme Court now has cast doubt on the continuing valid-
ity of these holdings. In these later companion cases, the court con-
cluded that the agency decisionmakers need not explain every finding of 
fact based on conflicting evidence as long as the findings are supported 
by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole. 
The holdings in Dennis and Hyde are best explained as a judicial 
accommodation between the statutory command of particularized find-
ings, and the institutional imperatives of agencies required to decide 
volumes of cases in an effort to accomplish mass justice. This newly 
refined balance is welcome. At some point, the imperatives of timeli-
ness, finality and economy in decisionmaking simply outweigh a theo-
retical desire to make every agency decision a model of exhaustively 
articulated administrative specificity. Increased specificity will not deter 
the administrator whose objective is to visit injustice on the innocent. 
On the other hand, the potential for delay, innocent mistake and proce-
dural confusion can be increased substantially if exhaustive findings 
must be marshalled for every sub-step of the agency reasoning process. 
Notwithstanding these judicial efforts to balance statutory dictates 
against institutional imperatives, the central requirement of articulated 
factual conclusions remains clear and eminently sound. The exclusivity 
of the record and the intelligibility of the ultimate agency decision are 
at the heart of the fairness of an administrative hearing. 103 Those con-
siderations generated a potentially far-reaching precedent on another 
issue in an Oregon case just discussed. In Dennis v. Employment Divi-
sion, both the court of appeals104 and the Oregon Supreme Court106 
concluded that the agency hearings officer has an affirmative duty to 
develop the record for decision. The obligation applies even if the as-
100. See Derochier v. Employment Div., 70 Or. App. 521, 690 P.2d 519 (1984); Ashmore v. 
Employment Div., 70 Or. App. 516, 690 P.2d 522 (1984). 
101. 302 Or. 160, 728 P.2d 12 (1986) (agency denial of unemployment benefits). 
102. 302 Or. 171, 728 P.2d 19 (1986) (agency disqualification of claimant seeking unem-
ployment benefits). 
103. These considerations distinguish the role of the judicial "hard look" in adjudicatory 
hearings from the more deferential posture earlier advanced respecting judicial review of adminis-
trative rulemaking. The underlying constitutional basis of the distinction, which has its roots in 
considerations of personal liberty, was articulated as early as the famous couplet of Londoner v. 
City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) and Bi-Metallic lnv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
104. 77 Or. App. 633, 713 P.2d 1079 (1986). 
105. 302 Or. 160, 728 P.2d 12 (1986). 
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signment means assisting the claimant. The court concluded that such 
assistance does not convert the hearings officer into an advocate. This 
responsibility, rather, is an accompaniment of the duty to conduct a full 
and fair inquiry into matters relevant to the inquiry. This court-im-
posed requirement was in the process of statutory codification during 
the pendency of the litigation.106 Therefore, the degree to which the 
Oregon Supreme Court would agree with the Court of Appeals that 
this extraordinarily activist consideration was grounded on purported 
Fourteenth Amendment considerations was effectively mooted. 
G. Trend 7: Continuing Confusion Exists over the Availability, 
Scope and Standards Governing judicial Review 
This trend would deserve comprehensive analysis but for the pio-
neering work of several scholars. A decade ago, Professor Donald Bro-
die and Justice Hans Linde masterfully chronicled the confusion ram-
pant in existing judicial decisions and statutory standards governing 
appellate review of state agency adjudications. 107 There is little new to 
add. 
A cursory review of cases decided under variants of the 1961 
MSAPA demonstrates that state courts continue to manipulate con-
clusory epithets such as "arbitrary and capricious," "clearly errone-
ous," "substantial evidence" and "abuse of discretion" to achieve a be-
wildering and often contradictory array of outcomes, without furthering 
the cause of judicial predictability in the process. Moreover, the stan-
dards themselves are often confused with, or even melded into each 
other. 108 Brodie and Linde cautioned against the use of such terms: 
Existing statutory and judicial formulations for reviewing the ex-
ercise of discretion are among the most unsatisfactory in the area of 
judicial review of agency action. Words such as "arbitrary," "capri-
106. See OR. REv. STAT.§ 183.415(10) (1983). 
107. Brodie & Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of 
Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537 (1977). A useful project of similar ambition recently has sought 
to bring much needed clarity to federal law in this area. See generally Levin, Scope-ofReview 
Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 239 (1986). 
108. See, e.g., Chavez v. Comm'n, 98 N.M. 462, 649 P.2d 1375 (1982) ("substantial evi-
dence" defined in terms of "legal residuum" rule); Billings v. Billings Firefighters, 200 Mont. 
421, 651 P.2d 627 (1982) ("substantial evidence" equivalent to review under "clearly erroneous" 
standard); (accord Gulick v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 452 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1982); In re Muzzy, 
141 Vt. 463, 449 A.2d 970 (1982) (difference between "substantial evidence" and broader "clearly 
erroneous" standards, though distinction "more semantic than substantive"); McClure v. Iowa 
Real Estate Comm'n, 356 N.W.2d 594 (1984) ("unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious" standard 
incorporates "abuse of discretion" standard); Adelman v. Bahou, 85 A.D.2d 862, 446 N.Y.S.2d 
500 (App. Div. 1981) ("substantial evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" tests apply "ration-
ality" standard). 
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cious," or "abuse of discretion," state conclusions, not premises from 
which a conclusion may be derived. When a statute or a line of prece-
dents instructs a reviewing court to set aside action found to be arbi-
trary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, it merely provides the 
terms in which the conclusion of invalidity may be pronounced. These 
terms do nothing to articulate the process of analysis by which the 
issue of invalidity is to be litigated and decided. Indeed, the presence 
of these conclusory epithets in statutes or case law as grounds for re-
versal is deceptive insofar as they appear to sanction review and re-
versal of governmental action on the basis of the judge's reaction to 
the particular circumstances before him, without any need for prem-
ises more searching than the stigmatizing phrases themselves.109 
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In light of this criticism, two concerns respecting the judicial review 
provisions of the new UAPA begin to emerge. The UAPA uses old 
model act language that is arguably surplusage, and dangerous surplus-
age at that. It also provides for a two-track system of judicial review 
that, unless monitored carefully, might magnify the dangers of the 
broad standards. Let us examine these concerns in turn. 
1. Linguistic surplusage 
The 1981 MSAPA includes an optional provisiOn perm1ttmg a 
court to find an action "otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious" as a ground for invalidity of an agency action.110 The Utah act 
expressly adopted this language, omitting only the epithet "unreasona-
ble."111 The Utah act also departs in a minor but potentially important 
manner from the Model Act by allowing invalidation of an action 
which is an "abuse of discretion."112 
It may be that settled judicial decisions construing "abuse of dis-
cretion" and the "arbitrary and capricious" standard under prior law 
give greater comfort to Utah courts and litigants than would be the case 
of new criteria woven from whole cloth. This conclusion probably is 
109. Brodie & Linde, supra note 107, at 550. 
110. MSAPA (1981) § 5-116(c)(8)(iv), 14 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1988). 
111. UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (Supp. 1988). Professor Harold Levinson sug-
gested at the Western States Seminar on State and Local Administrative Law in Salt Lake City, in 
January 22, 1988, that the retention by Utah of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard may 
simply have been the product of drafters' oversight. Levinson, a co-author of the 1981 MSAPA, 
recounted that the standard was retained in the MSAPA primarily to apply to judicial review of 
rulemaking. Yet all MSAPA rulemaking provisions were omitted from the Utah Act. Since the 
judicial review provisions cover all aspects of administrative procedure, retention of the "arbitrary 
and capricious" standard may, in part, have been an innocent mistake. 
112. UTAH Coot: ANN.§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (Supp. 1988). The Model Act uses the more 
limited, or at least arguably clearer language "outside the range of discretion delegated to the 
agency by any provision of law." MSAPA (1981) § 5-116(c)(8)(i), 14 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1988). 
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suspect for three reasons. 
First, a list of exhaustive and specific standards governing judicial 
review immediately precedes this catch-all standard in the UAPA. It is 
difficult to envision a defect in agency action that is not otherwise effec-
tively identified. 113 Those standards serve to invalidate action that is 
unconstitutional, beyond agency jurisdiction, incomplete, legally errone-
ous, unlawful in its procedure, taken by an improper decisionmaker, 
made without adequate evidence, made contrary to rule, or decided con-
trary to past agency practice.114 The list of methods to attack potential 
administrative atrocities seems exhaustive on its face. 
Second, but related, the mere inclusion of these additional labels 
suggests that they refer to some characteristic of agency action not sub-
sumed by the other criteria, complete as those criteria seem. This per-
ception will serve to elevate the power-though certainly not the pre-
dictability-of reviewing courts. The UAPA drafters may well have 
intended the UAPA as an ultimate broad judicial check on agency ac-
tion; but, this authority may unintentionally confer upon the courts a 
free-floating censorial power which is as standardless as the UAPA 
otherwise prohibits the actions of agencies to be. 
Finally, the phrases "abuse of discretion" and "arbitrary and ca-
pricious," unless construed narrowly, are almost certain to contribute 
unnecessarily to judicial workload. Litigants who fail to find other stat-
utory bases available may attempt increasingly to import these tradi-
tionally baffling common law concepts into statutes when the statutes 
were designed in major respects to render those concepts obsolete. The 
benefits of decisive and well-reasoned administrative expertise may be 
lost if some degree of deference is not given to an agency process not 
otherwise assailable under the new standards set forth in the UAPA. In 
short, if these tired phrases are not repealed altogether they should, at 
113. Oregon Supreme Court Justice Michael Gillette suggested at the Western States Semi-
nar on State and Local Administrative Law on January 21, 1988, the following hypothetical 
potentially justifying an "abuse of discretion" standard: Suppose an environmental enforcement 
agency is delegated authority to fine polluters between $200 and $10,000. A corporation thereafter 
is assessed the full $10,000 civil penalty for a trivial infraction. Is not the action only challengeable 
under an "abuse of discretion" standard? 
My response is three-fold. First, if the agency action is within the range of delegated discre-
tion, the quarrel should be with the legislature for irresponsible abdication of authority, not with 
the agency for acting within legally cunferred limits. Second, there exist powerful political controls 
elsewhere in the MSAPA and the UAPA to provide checks on such agency misbehavior through 
public hearings and legislative and executive review of rules. Finally, unless this were the very 
first enforcement action taken by the agency, the corporation could rlaim judicial redress by show-
ing that the action is "contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the incon-
sistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency . 
. . . "UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (Supp. 1988). 
114. UTAH Com: ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(a-h) (Supp. 1988). 
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best, be regarded as surplusage or only as catch-all residue to be relied 
upon only in the most extreme case of agency lawlessness. 
2. Two-tier judicial review 
A well-intentioned outsider might advance a second concern re-
lated to the prospects of the two-tiered system of judicial review under 
the Utah act.IU~ Under the new law, formal adjudicative proceedings 
are reviewed by the Supreme Court, or other appellate courts desig-
nated by statute.U6 However, informal adjudicative proceedings are re-
viewable in district courts. The review is de novo whether or not there 
is a record of the proceedings.U7 
There is no serious quarrel with the appropriateness of de novo 
review of an agency action not based on a record. However, choosing to 
have trial court review of adjudications, formal or informal, where 
there is a developed record, presents a more serious set of concerns. 
First, such review may initially inhibit the growth of a developed 
body of consistent law respecting such adjudications. A unified appel-
late court develops such law by necessity; the many different local juris-
dictions may instead simply balkanize the development of administra-
tive law doctrine for no reason other than the potentially large numbers 
of jurisdictions available as forums. The same agency may be subject to 
the different law of different counties depending on the choice of dis-
trict court forum. 
Second, if litigants are in doubt respecting what adjudicative pro-
cess they have undergone, or should have undergone, (formal adjudica-
tive proceedings or informal adjudicative proceedings) they may file for 
review at the wrong appellate level. The possibility of such wasteful 
accidents is both real and unfair. A multi-tiered system of judicial re-
view encourages such expensive risks. 
Third, trial and appellate courts generally apply different stan-
dards respecting the formalities of the law of evidence. The UAPA re-
tains the "legal residuum" rule. 118 Yet under the MSAPA, the gener-
ally permissible uses of hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings 
are far broader than otherwise would be permissible in the trial of civil 
115. The author is deeply indebted to Professor Harold Levinson for his initial exploration 
of these considerations at the Western States Seminar on State and Local Administrative Law. See 
supra note 111. 
116. UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 63-46b-16(1) (Supp. 1988). 
117. UTAH Com: ANN.§ 63-46b-15(1)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
118. Under the legal residuum rule, administrative findings must be supported by some evi-
dence that would be admissible in judicial proceedings, even if the agency's authority to receive 
evidence is not limited by traditional evidentiary rules. See K.C. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE 239 (2nd. ed. 1980). 
26 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
actions. Restricting administrative proceedings to the standards of Utah 
Rules of Evidence on judicial review119 may further inhibit the utiliza-
tion of the administrative process to its fullest potential in seeking in-
formal resolution of disputes. 
Fourth, the existence of alternative forums for review may intro-
duce undesirable elements. Litigants or agencies may engage in forum 
shopping or, even worse, may play gamesmanship as to the very choice 
of their adjudicative process with one eye securely on the appellate fo-
rum most likely to favor them. 
Finally, as is well established, there are important differences in 
the very environments occupied respectively by trial and appellate 
courts. Trial judges may find it hard to discard their otherwise entirely 
appropriate judicial habits when faced with the sometimes foreign ad-
ministrative law concepts of deference to agency discretion, the role of 
agency expertise, the doctrine of official notice and other legal con-
structs designed to strike an appropriate balance between executive and 
judicial branch responsibilities in the development of public law. 
CoNCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the concerns just expressed, the Utah act has 
great promise of enabling the development of the legal certainty and 
clarity its framers have promised. But on the horizon of a more distant 
future lies an even more ambitious undertaking which Utah and other 
path-breaking jurisdictions may yet contemplate.120 
This Utah statute speaks to judicial review of agency adjudicatory 
action. Unlike the Model Act, it does not purport to cover review of 
agency rulemaking, nor is it designed to encompass in a unified manner 
the other types of legal remedy for administrative agency action which 
developed at common law. Finally, it is limited to actions taken by state 
agencies, not those of local governments. 
The next generation of innovation in judicial review is poised to 
explore a unified approach to this challenge. A unified judicial review 
statute has both promise and pitfalls. It greatly simplifies the proce-
dural quagmire created by old common law writs and remedies. It must 
be drafted so that defenses immunities and procedural requirements 
which presently guard the ambit of legitimate and needed government 
discretion can be preserved. The task of accommodation will not be 
easy. Yet, with the experience of its recently enacted and pioneering 
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-15(3)(b) (Supp. 1988). 
120. See generally Safriet, judicial Review of Govemment Action: Procedural Quandaries 
and a Plea for Legislative Reform, 15 ENVTL. L. REv. 217 (1985). 
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reforms, Utah is ably equipped to help lead this new thrust. 
The Utah experience is in broad accord with the state administra-
tive law trends identified in this article. The relative youth of Utah 
administrative law is not a curse; if anything, it is a benefit. Common 
law principles respecting administrative procedure have not become en-
crusted by decades of judicial gloss. Instead, drawing on the best na-
tional models available, Utah can implement a modern statutory 
scheme which is both the product of innovation and the opportunity for 
further pioneering efforts in public law reform. 
